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Abstract (208 words) 21 
Big data, high-performance computing, and (deep) machine learning are increasingly noted as key to 22 
precision medicine –from identifying disease risks and taking preventive measures, to making 23 
diagnoses and personalising treatment for individuals. Precision medicine, however, is not only 24 
2 
 
about predicting risks and outcomes, but also about weighing interventions. Interventional clinical 25 
predictive models require the correct specification of cause and effect, and the calculation of so-26 
called counterfactuals, i.e. alternative scenarios. In biomedical research, observational studies are 27 
commonly affected by confounding and selection bias. Without robust assumptions, often requiring 28 
a priori domain knowledge, causal inference is not feasible. Data-driven prediction models are often 29 
mistakenly used to draw causal effects, but neither their parameters nor their predictions necessarily 30 
have a causal interpretation. Therefore, the premise that data-driven prediction models lead to 31 
trustable decisions/interventions for precision medicine is questionable. When pursuing intervention 32 
modelling, the bio-health informatics community needs to employ causal approaches and learn 33 
causal structures. Here we discuss how target trials (algorithmic emulation of randomized studies), 34 
transportability (the license to transfer causal effects from one population to another) and prediction 35 
invariance (where a true causal model is contained in the set of all prediction models whose accuracy 36 
does not vary across different settings) are linchpins to developing and testing intervention models. 37 
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Introduction 43 
Advances in computing and machine learning have opened unprecedented paths to processing and 44 
inferring knowledge from big data. Deep learning has been game-changing for many analytics 45 
challenges, beating humans and other machine learning approaches in decision/action tasks, such as 46 
playing games, and aiding/augmenting tasks such as driving or recognising manipulated images. 47 
Deep learning’s potential applications in healthcare have been widely speculated 1, especially in 48 
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precision medicine –the timely and tailored prevention, identification, diagnosis, and treatment of 49 
disease. However, the use of data-driven machine learning approaches to model causality, for 50 
instance, to uncover new causes of disease or assess treatment effects, carries dangers of unintended 51 
consequences. Therefore the Hippocratic principle of ‘first do no harm’ is being adopted 2 alongside 52 
rigorous study design, validation, and implementation, with attention to ethics and bias avoidance. 53 
Precision medicine models are not only descriptive or predictive, e.g. assessing the mortality risk for 54 
a patient undergoing a surgical procedure, but also decision-supporting/interventional, e.g. choosing 55 
and personalising the procedure with the highest probability of favourable outcome. Predicting risks 56 
and outcomes differs from weighing interventions and intervening. Prediction calculates a future 57 
event in the absence of any action or change; intervention presumes an enacted choice that may 58 
influence the future, which requires consideration of the underlying causal structure. 59 
Intervention imagines how the world would be if we made different choices, e.g. “would the patient be 60 
cured if we administered amoxicillin instead of a cephalosporin for their upper respiratory tract infection?” or “if that 61 
pre-hypertensive patient had accomplished ten to fifteen minutes of moderate physical activity per day instead of being 62 
prescribed a diuretic, would they have become hypertensive five years later?” By asking ourselves what would 63 
have been the effect of something if we had not taken an action, or vice versa, we are computing so-64 
called ‘counterfactuals’. Among different counterfactual options, we choose the ones that minimise 65 
harm while maximising patient benefit. A similar cognitive process happens when a deep learning 66 
machine plays a game and must decide on the next move. Such artificial neural network architecture 67 
has been fed the game ruleset, millions of game scenarios, and has learned through trial and error by 68 
playing against other human players, networks or even against itself. In each move of the game, the 69 
machine chooses the best counterfactual move based on its domain knowledge 3,4. 70 
With domain knowledge of the variables involved in a hypothesised cause-effect route and enough 71 
data generated at random to cover all possible path configurations, it is possible to deduce causal 72 
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effects and calculate counterfactuals. Randomisation and domain knowledge are key: when either is 73 
not met, causal inference may be flawed 5. 74 
In clinical research, randomised controlled trials (RCTs) permit direct testing of causal hypotheses 75 
since randomisation is guaranteed a priori by design even with limited domain knowledge. On the 76 
other hand, observational data collected retrospectively usually does not fulfil such requirements, 77 
thus limiting what secondary data analyses can discover. For instance, databases collating electronic 78 
medical records do not explicitly record domain/contextual knowledge (e.g. why one drug was 79 
prescribed over another) and are littered with many types of bias, including protopathic bias (when a 80 
therapy is given based on symptoms, yet the disease is undiagnosed), indication bias (when a risk 81 
factor appears to be associated with a health outcome, but the outcome may be caused by the reason 82 
for which the risk factor initially appeared), or selection bias (when a study population does not 83 
represent the target population, e.g. insured people or hospitalised patients). 84 
Therefore, the development of health intervention models from observational data (no matter how 85 
big) is problematic, regardless of the method used (no matter how deep) because of the nature of 86 
the data. Fitting a machine learning model to observational data and using it for counterfactual 87 
prediction may lead to harmful consequences. One famous example is that of prediction tools for 88 
crime recidivism that convey racial discriminatory bias 6. Any instrument inferred from existing 89 
population data may be biased by gender, sexual orientation, race, or ethnicity discrimination, and 90 
carry forward such bias when employed to aid decisions 7. 91 
The health and biomedical informatics community, charged with maximising the utility of healthcare 92 
information, needs to be attuned to the limitations of data-driven inference of intervention models, 93 
and needs safeguards for counterfactual prediction modelling. These topics are addressed here as 94 
follows: first, we give a brief outline of causality, counterfactuals, and the problem of inferring 95 
cause-effect relations from observational data; second, we provide examples where automated 96 
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learning has failed to infer a trustworthy counterfactual model for precision medicine; third, we offer 97 
insights on methodologies for automated causal inference; finally, we describe potential approaches 98 
to validate automated causal inference methods, including transportability and prediction invariance. 99 
We aim not to criticise the use of machine learning for the development of clinical prediction 100 
models 8,9, but rather clarify that prediction and intervention models have different developmental 101 
paths and intended uses 10. We recognise the promising applications of machine learning in 102 
healthcare for descriptive/predictive tasks rather than interventional tasks, e.g. screening images for 103 
diabetic retinopathy 11, even when diagnostic models have been shown to be susceptible to errors 104 
when applied to different population 12. Yet, it is important to distinguish prediction works from 105 
others that seek to optimise treatment decisions and are clearly interventional 13, where validating 106 
counterfactuals becomes necessary. 107 
Causal inference and counterfactuals 108 
Causality has been described in various ways. For the purpose of this work, it is useful to recall the 109 
deterministic (yet can be made probabilistic) definitions by means of counterfactual conditionals –110 
e.g. the original 1748 proposition by Hume or the 1973 formalisation by Lewis 14– paraphrased as: 111 
an event E causally depends on C if, and only if, E always follows after C and E does not occur 112 
when C has not occurred (unless something else caused E). The counterfactual-based definition 113 
contains an implicit time component and works in a chained manner, where effects can become 114 
causes of other subsequent effects. Causes can be regarded as necessary, sufficient, contributory, or 115 
non-redundant 15. 116 
Causal inference addresses the problem of ascertaining causes and effects from data. Causes can be 117 
determined through prospective experiments to observe E after C is tried or withheld, by keeping 118 
constant all other possible factors that can influence either the choice of C or the happening of E, or 119 
–what is easier and more often done– randomising the choice of C. Formally, we acknowledge that 120 
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the conditional probability P(E|C) of observing E after observing C can be different from the 121 
interventional probability P(E|do(C)) of observing E after doing C. In RCTs –when C is 122 
randomised– the ‘do’ is guaranteed and unconditioned, while with observational data, it is not. 123 
Causal calculus helps resolve interventional from conditional probabilities when a causal structure is 124 
assumed 16. Figure 1 illustrates the difference between observing and doing using biomedical target 125 
examples. 126 
In a nutshell, the major hurdles to ascertaining causal effects from observational data include: the 127 
failure to disambiguate interventional from conditional distributions, to identify all potential sources 128 
of bias 17 and to select an appropriate functional form for all variables, i.e. model misspecification 18–129 
20. 130 
Two well-known types of bias are confounding and collider bias (Figure 2). Given an outcome, i.e. 131 
the objective of a (counterfactual) prediction, confounding occurs when there exists a variable that 132 
causes the outcome and the effect, leading to the conclusion that an exposure is associated with the 133 
outcome even though it does not cause it. For instance, cigarette smoking causes both nicotine-134 
stained, yellow fingers and lung cancer. Yellow fingers, as the exposure or independent variable, can 135 
be spuriously associated with lung cancer if smoking, the underlying confounding variable, is 136 
unaccounted. Yellow fingers alone could be used to predict lung cancer but cleaning the skin would 137 
not reduce the risk of lung cancer. Therefore, an intervention model that used yellow fingers as the 138 
actionable item would be futile, while a model that actioned upon smoking (the cause) would be 139 
effective in reducing lung cancer risk. 140 
A collider is a variable that is caused by both the exposure (or causes of the exposure) and the 141 
outcome (or causes of the outcome). Conditioning on a collider biases the estimate of the causal 142 
effect of exposure on outcome. A classic example involves the association between locomotor and 143 
respiratory diseases. Originally observed in hospitalised patients and thought biologically plausible, 144 
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this association could not be established in the general population 21. In this case, hospitalisation 145 
status functions as a collider because it introduces selection bias, as people with locomotor disease 146 
or respiratory disease have higher risk of being admitted to hospital. 147 
Another example of collider bias is the obesity paradox 22. This paradox refers to the 148 
counterintuitive evidence of lower mortality among people who are obese within certain clinical 149 
subpopulations, e.g. in patients with heart failure. A more careful consideration of the covariate-150 
outcome relationship in this case reveals heart failure is a collider. Had an intervention been 151 
developed by means of such model, treating obesity would not have been suggested as an actionable 152 
feature to reduce the risk of mortality. 153 
Causal inference can become more complex when a variable may be mistaken for a confounder but 154 
actually functions as a collider. This phenomenon is called M-bias since the associated causal 155 
diagram is usually drawn in an M-shaped form 23,24. A classic M-bias example is the effect of 156 
education on diabetes, controlled through family history of diabetes and income. In a hypothetical 157 
study, it could be reasonable to regard mother’s (or father’s) history of diabetes as a confounder, 158 
because it is associated with both education level and diabetes status, and it is not caused by either. 159 
However, family history of diabetes’ associations with the education and diabetes are not causal but 160 
are in turn confounded by family income and family genetic risk for diabetes, respectively, that 161 
might not be measured as input (Figure 3). At this point, mother’s diabetes becomes a collider, and 162 
including it would induce a biased association between education and diabetes through the links 163 
from family income and genetic risk. Specifically, the estimate of the causal effect of education on 164 
diabetes would be biased. In general, including mother’s diabetes in the input covariate would lead 165 
to bias both if there was a zero or non-zero causal effect 25; however, if the unmeasured covariates 166 
were included, the bias would be resolved (by a so-called backdoor path blocking) 26. The M-bias 167 
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example shows how the causal structure choice (which could be machine learned) can influence the 168 
causal effect inference; we will discuss the two more in detail later a specific section. 169 
For brevity, we do not describe moderators, mediators, and other important concepts in causality 170 
modelling. Nonetheless, it is useful to mention instrumental variables, which determine variation in 171 
an explanatory variable, e.g. a treatment, but have no independent effect on the outcome of interest. 172 
Instrumental variables, therefore, can be used to resolve unmeasured confounding in absence of 173 
prospective randomisation. 174 
An old neural network fiasco and a new possible paradox 175 
In 1997, Cooper et al. 27 investigated several machine learning models, including rule-based and 176 
neural networks, for predicting mortality of hospital patients admitted with pneumonia. The neural 177 
network greatly outperformed logistic regression; however, the authors discouraged using black box 178 
models in clinical practice. They showed how the rule-based method learned that ‘IF patient 179 
admitted (with pneumonia) has history of asthma THEN patient has lower risk of death from 180 
pneumonia’ 28. This counterintuitive association was also later confirmed using generalised additive 181 
models 29. The physicians explained that patients admitted with pneumonia and known history of 182 
asthma would likely be transferred to intensive care and treated aggressively, thus having higher odds 183 
of survival than the general population admitted with pneumonia. The authors recommended to 184 
employ interpretable models instead of black boxes, to identify counterintuitive, surprising patterns 185 
and remove them. At this point, the model development is no longer automated and requires 186 
domain knowledge. Upon reflection, those models inferred without modifications, either 187 
interpretable or black box, would have worked well at predicting mortality but they could not have 188 
been used to test new interventions to reduce mortality, as the recommended actions would have 189 
consequentially led to ‘less care’ for asthmatic patients. 190 
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More recently, a possible data-driven improvement in the evaluation of fall risk in hospitals was 191 
investigated 30. Standard practice involves a nurse-led evaluation of patients’ history of falls, 192 
comorbidities, mental health, gait, ambulatory aids, and intravenous therapy summarised with the 193 
Morse scale. To assess the predictive ability of the Morse scale (standard practice), its individual 194 
components, and new expert-based predictors (e.g. extended clinical profiles and information on 195 
hospital staffing levels), a matched study was performed including patients with and without a fall. 196 
Logistic regression and decision trees were used. The additional variables hypothesised by the 197 
experts were associated with the outcome and all new models yielded higher discrimination than the 198 
Morse scale, but a surprising finding was observed: in all configurations, older patients were at a 199 
lower risk of falls. This is contrary to current expert’s knowledge, which associates older age with 200 
increased frailty and therefore fall risk. If such model were used for intervention, it would not 201 
prioritise the elderly for fall prevention –a potentially devastating consequence of data-driven 202 
inference. It is uncertain if this old age paradox is due to a bias. One possible explanation is that 203 
older patients are usually monitored and aided more frequently because they are indeed at higher 204 
risk, while younger people may be more independent and less prone to accept assistance. Other 205 
issues at play could be survivorship bias, selectively unreported falls, and study design. One possible 206 
approach to bias reduction is to design the study and extract the data by simulating an RCT, where 207 
causal effects on “randomised” interventions can be estimated directly, as we discuss in the next 208 
section. 209 
The target trial 210 
Target trials refer to RCTs that can be emulated using data from large, observational databases to 211 
answer causal questions of comparative treatment effect 31. Although RCTs are the gold standard for 212 
discerning causal effects, there exists many scenarios in which they are neither feasible nor ethical to 213 
conduct. Alternatively, observational data appropriately adjusted for measured confounding bias –214 
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for instance, via propensity score matching– can be used to emulate randomised treatment 215 
assignment; this may be feasible with electronic medical records where many individual-level 216 
attributes can be linked to resolve bias. The target trial protocol requires prospective enrolment-like 217 
eligibility criteria, a description of treatment strategies and assignment procedures, the identification 218 
of time course from a baseline to the outcome, a causal query (e.g. treatment effect), and an analysis 219 
plan (e.g. a regression model), as shown in Table 1.   220 
As an example of the target trial framework, data from public surveillance and clinical claims 221 
repositories were used to replicate two RCTs, one investigating treatment effects on colorectal 222 
cancer and the other on pancreatic adenocarcinoma 32. Each study explicitly adhered to the target 223 
trial framework, deviating from the RCT design only in the assignment procedures, justifiably due to 224 
lack of randomisation. The results were consistent with the target trials –all of which reported a null 225 
effect. In contrast, when the authors modelled the treatment effects using a non-RCT-like study 226 
design with the same variables, the mortality estimates were both inconsistent with the target trials. 227 
These examples demonstrate the need to uphold target trial design in the investigation of treatment 228 
effects using observational data. Moreover, coupled with machine learning methods equipped to 229 
extrapolate more useful information from big data sources, the target trial framework has the 230 
potential to serve as the foundation for exploring causal processes currently unknown. 231 
Causal effect inference and automated learning of causal structures 232 
Prediction models inferred automatically using data without any domain knowledge –from linear 233 
regression to deep learning– only approximate a function, and do not necessarily hold a causal 234 
meaning. Instead, by estimating interventional in place of conditional probabilities, models can 235 
reproduce causal mechanisms. Through counterfactual predictions, models become interventional, 236 
actionable, and avoid the pitfalls such as those described in the pneumonia and fall risk examples. In 237 
the previous sections we showed that it is possible to directly estimate causal effects by generating 238 
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data through RCTs or by simulating RCTs with observational data. Here, we delve further into the 239 
approaches to unveiling and disambiguating causality from observational data, including the 240 
assumptions to be made. We can categorise two main tasks: (i) estimating causal effects, and (ii) 241 
learning causal structures. In the first one, a causal structure, or a set of cause-effect relationships 242 
and pathways, is defined a priori, input variables are fixed, and causal effects are estimated for a 243 
specific input-output pair, e.g. causal effect of  diabetes on glaucoma. Directed acyclic graphs 244 
(DAGs) 33 –also known as Bayesian networks– and structural equation models 34,35 are often used to 245 
model such structures. While with RCT data the estimation of causal effects can be done directly, 246 
the estimation of causal effects from observational data requires thoughtful handling of potential 247 
biases and confounding. Methods like inverse probability weighting attempt to weigh single 248 
observations to mimic the effects of randomisation with respect to one variable of interest (e.g. an 249 
exposure or a treatment) 36. Other techniques include targeted maximum likelihood estimation 37–39, 250 
g-methods 40,41, and propensity score matching 42. Often, these estimators can be coupled with 251 
machine learning, e.g. causal decision trees 43, Bayesian regression trees 44, and random forests for 252 
estimating individual treatment effects 45. As previously mentioned, model misspecification –i.e. 253 
defining the wrong causal structure and the choice of variables to handle confounding and bias– can 254 
lead to wrong estimation of causal effects. With big data, especially datasets with numerous features, 255 
choosing adjustments and even over-adjusting using all variables, is problematic. Feature selection 256 
algorithms based on conditional independence scoring have been proposed 46. 257 
Automated causal structure learning uses conditional independence tests and structure search 258 
algorithms over given DAGs subject to certain assumptions, e.g. ‘causal sufficiency’ that is no 259 
unmeasured common causes and no selection bias. In 1990, an important result on independence 260 
and conditional independence constraints –the d-separation equivalence theorem 47– led to the 261 
development of automated search and ambiguity resolution of causal structures from data, through 262 
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so-called patterns and partial ancestral graphs. When assumptions are met (Markov/causal 263 
faithfulness 48), there are asymptotically correct procedures that can predict an effect or raise an 264 
ambiguity, and determine graph equivalence 49. However, the probability of an effect cannot be 265 
obtained without deciding on a prior distribution of the graphs and parameters. Also, the number of 266 
graphs is super-exponential in the number of observed variables and may even be infinite with 267 
hidden variables 50, making an exhaustive search computationally unfeasible 51. Today, several 268 
heuristic methods for causal structure search are available, from the PC algorithm that assumes 269 
causal sufficiency, to others like FCI or RFCI that extend to latent variables 52,53. 270 
The enrichment of deep learning with causal methods also provides interesting new insights to 271 
address bias. For instance, a theoretical analysis for identification of individual treatment effect 272 
under strong ignorability has been derived 54, and an approach to exploit instrumental variables for 273 
counterfactual prediction within deep learning is also available 55.  274 
Model transportability and prediction invariance 275 
Validation of causal effects under determined causal structures is especially needed when such 276 
effects are estimated in limited settings, e.g. RCTs. Transportability is a data fusion framework for 277 
external validation of intervention models and counterfactual queries. As defined by Pearl and 278 
Bareinboim 56, transportability is a “license to transfer causal effects learned in experimental studies 279 
to a new population, in which only observational studies can be conducted.” By combining datasets 280 
generated under heterogeneous conditions, transportability provides formal mathematical tools to (i) 281 
evaluate whether results from one study (e.g. a causal relationship identified in an RCT) could be 282 
used to generate valid estimates of the same causal effect in another study of different setting (e.g. an 283 
observational study of the same causal effect in a different population); and (ii) estimate what the 284 
causal effect would have been if the study had been conducted in the new setting 57,58. The 285 
framework utilises selection diagrams 59, encoding the causal relationships of variables of interest in a 286 
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study population, and about the characteristics in which the target and study populations differ. If 287 
the structural constraints among variables in the selection diagrams are resolvable through the do-288 
calculus, a valid estimate of the causal effect in the target population can be calculated using the 289 
extant causal effect from the original study, which means that the observed causal effect is 290 
transportable. 291 
One of Pearl’s transportability examples is shown in Figure 4. In this example, a RCT is conducted 292 
in city A (original environment) and a causal effect of treatment x on outcome y, ܲ(ݕ|݀݋(ݔ)), is 293 
determined. We wish to generalise if the treatment works also in the population of city B (target 294 
environment) where only observational data is available, since it happens that the age distribution in 295 
city A, ܲ(ݖ), is different than that ܲ∗(ݖ) in city B. The city B specific x-to-y causal effect 296 
ܲ∗൫ݕห݀݋(ݔ)൯ is estimated as:        297 
ܲ∗൫ݕห݀݋(ݔ)൯ = ෍ܲ(ݕ|݀݋(ݔ), ݖ)ܲ∗(ݖ)
௭
 
In this transport formula, the age-specific causal effects estimated in the RCT, ܲ(ݕ|݀݋(ݔ), ݖ), is 298 
combined with the observed age distribution in the target population, ܲ∗(ݖ), to obtain the causal 299 
effect ܲ∗൫ݕห݀݋(ݔ)൯ in city B.  300 
On the other hand, a causal effect is not always transportable. Following the example above, the x-301 
to-y causal effect is not transportable from City A to City B if only the overall causal effect 302 
ܲ(ݕ|݀݋(ݔ)) is known whereas the age-specific causal effect ܲ(ݕ|݀݋(ݔ), ݖ) is unknown.  303 
Transportability theory is being extended to a variety of more complex causal relationships, e.g. 304 
sample selection bias 58, leaping forward from toy examples to real-world problems 60. Therefore –305 
linking back with the problematic examples we discussed in the previous sections– one could use 306 
transportability to determine how the asthma or old age effects are/are not transportable from one 307 
population to another. It is also worth noting how transportability evokes the field of domain 308 
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adaptation, which aims to learn a model in one source population that can be used in a different 309 
target distribution. In fact, domain adaptation has been employed to address sample selection bias 61. 310 
An interesting next of kin to transportability is prediction invariance 62. Among all models that show 311 
invariance in their predictive accuracy across different experimental settings and interventions, there 312 
is a high probability that the causal model will be a member of that set. For example, Schulam and 313 
Saria 72 introduced the counterfactual Gaussian process to predict continuous-time trajectories under 314 
irregular sampling, handling biases arising from clinical protocols. In another work, aimed at 315 
addressing issues of supervised learning when training and target distributions differ (i.e. dataset 316 
shift), Saria et al. 63 proposed the ‘surgery estimator’, defined as an interventional distribution 16 that 317 
is invariant to differences across environments. The surgery estimator works by learning a 318 
relationship in the training data that is generalisable to the target population, by incorporating prior 319 
knowledge about the data generating process that are expected to differ between the original and 320 
target populations. It was applied in real-world cases where causal structures were unknown. 321 
Conclusions 322 
We explored common pitfalls of data-driven developments in machine learning for healthcare, 323 
distinguishing between prediction and intervention models that are actionable in support of clinical 324 
decision-making. Importantly, the development of intervention models requires careful 325 
consideration of causality. Hernan et al. 64 commented that “a recent influx of data analysts, many 326 
not formally trained in statistical theory, bring a fresh attitude that does not a priori exclude causal 327 
questions” yet called –and we strongly endorse such call– for training curricula in data science that 328 
well-differentiate descriptive, prediction, and intervention modelling.  329 
Undertaking causal machine learning is key to ethical artificial intelligence for healthcare, equivalent 330 
to a doctor’s oath to “first do no harm” 65. Healthcare intervention models involve actionable inputs 331 
and need –implicitly or explicitly– to model causal pathways to compute the correct counterfactuals. 332 
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There are ongoing discussions in the machine learning community about model explainability for 333 
bias avoidance and fairness in decisions 66. Bias is a core topic in causal theory. Explainability may be 334 
a ‘weaker’ model property than causality. Explaining the role of input variables in changing the 335 
output of a black box neither assures a correct interpretation of the input-output mechanism nor 336 
unveils the cause-effect relationships. For instance, in a deep learning system that predicts the risk of 337 
heart attack, a subsequent analysis could be able to explain that the input variables ‘race’ and ‘blood 338 
pressure’ affect the risk, but could not say if these findings are causal, since they may be biased by 339 
stratification, unmeasured confounders, or mediated by other factors in the causal pathway. Fairness 340 
in machine learning aims at developing models that avoid social discrimination due to historically 341 
biased data and  involves the same conceptual hurdles as learning from observational data. In fact, 342 
the usage of causal models has been advocated to identify and mitigate discriminatory relationships 343 
in data 67. Recently, a study in cancer prognostics presented a causal structure coupled to deep 344 
learning to eliminate collider bias and provide unbiased individual predictions 68, although it did not 345 
explicitly test for transportability.  346 
For context-specific intervention models, where a causal structure is available or a target trial design 347 
can be devised, we then recommend evaluation of model transportability for a given set of action 348 
queries, e.g. treatment options or risk modifiers. For broader exploratory analyses where causal 349 
structures need to be identified or clarified, prediction invariance could be used. Transportability and 350 
prediction invariance could become core tools to reporting protocols for intervention models, in line 351 
with the current standards for prognostic and diagnostic models 69. A transportable model can be 352 
integrated into clinical guidelines to augment healthcare with action-savvy predictions, in pursuit of 353 
better precision medicine.  354 
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 534 
Figure Legends 535 
Figure 1. Conditional vs. interventional probabilities. When we observe data, e.g. electronic 536 
medical records, we can learn a model that predicts the probability of a disease D given 537 
certain risk factors R, i.e. P(D|R), or a model that predicts the chance of an health outcome 538 
O for a given treatment T, i.e. P(O|T). However, these models cannot be used to support 539 
decisions, because they assume that variables of the model remain unchanged, people keep 540 
their lifestyles, and the standard of care is followed. When a risk factor is modified or a new 541 
treatment is tested, e.g. in a randomised controlled trial, then we ‘make’ new data, and 542 
compute different probabilities, which are P(D|do(R)) and P(O|do(T)). Conditional and 543 
interventional probabilities are not necessarily the same, e.g. treatments are randomised in 544 
trials, while they are not in clinical practice. 545 
Figure 2. Examples of confounding bias and collider bias. Confounding (panel a) can occur 546 
when there exists a common cause for both exposure and outcome, while a collider (panel b) 547 
is a common effect of both exposure and outcome. Not including a confounder or including 548 
24 
 
a collider in a model results in biased associations. 549 
Figure 3. An example of M-bias. When estimating the effect of education level on diabetes risk, 550 
mother’s history of diabetes could be mistaken as a confounder and included in a model, but 551 
it is a collider by the effect of history of family income and genetic risk. 552 
Figure 4. A selection diagram for illustrating transportability. A causal effect of treatment x on 553 
outcome y, ܲ(ݕ|݀݋(ݔ)), is found through an RCT, and quantified in the original environment of 554 
city A (panel a). The x-to-y causal effect is transportable from City A to City B as ܲ∗൫ݕห݀݋(ݔ)൯ 555 
(panel b) if both the overall causal effect ܲ(ݕ|݀݋(ݔ)) and the age-specific causal effect 556 
ܲ(ݕ|݀݋(ݔ), ݖ) are known, whilst it is not transportable if the latter is unknown. 557 
 558 
Tables 559 
Table 1. The target trial protocol. Emulation of a randomised clinical trial using observational 560 
data and algorithmic randomisation, with the objective to reduce bias and allow more reliable 561 
treatment effects estimates. 562 
 RCT Target Trial 
Data source Prospective Observational 
Sample size Small Large 
Variables Few Many 
Eligibility and time zero 
(baseline) 
Straightforward  Problematic (e.g. multiple 
baseline points, follow up 
requirements) 
Treatment assignment Randomised by design Randomised algorithmically 
(e.g. propensity score 
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matching) 
Outcome evaluation Flexible  Flexible (with some caveats 
for blind outcome studies) 
Analysis plan Relatively straightforward 
(e.g. intention to treat) and 
flexible (e.g. Bayesian 
adaptive), but can further 
require bias correction (e.g. g-
formula) 
More complex (need also to 
model treatment assignment) 
yet can use same techniques 
as for RCT (e.g. g-formula) 
Risk of bias Relatively low Possible (e.g. residual 
confounding, wrong choice 
of time zero) 
Flexibility to assess extra-
protocol causal effects 
Limited High 
 563 
Observe data
Predict
P( D | R ) P( O | T )
P( D | do(R) ) P( O | do(T) )
Personal lifestyle
Change a risk
behavior
Guidelines
Choose a new
treatment
P( T | D )
Randomized
controlled trials( )
Electronic
medical
records( )
Treatments
T
Health
outcomes
O
Disease
diagnoses
D
Risk factors
R
Intervene
Make data
Model inputsModel inputs
Biased association when
confounder is not included
Biased association when
collider is included
Confounder
Smoking
Exposure
Yellow fingers
Outcome
Lung cancer
Collider
Hospitalization
Exposure
Locomotor disease
Outcome
Respiratory disease
a b
Model inputs
Exposure
Low education
Outcome
Diabetes
Unmeasured
Mother's genetic
diabetes risk
Collider
Mother had diabetes
Unmeasured
Family income
during childhood
Original environment
(City A, interventional)
P(y│do(x) )
Z
(Age)
X
(Treatment)
Y
(Outcome)
a
Target environment
(City B, observational)
P* (y│do(x) )
Z*
(Age)
X
(Treatment)
Y
(Outcome)
b
Transport
* P(y│do(x), z )Êis known
* P(y│do(x), z )Êis unknown
